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Did	young	voters	turn	out	in	droves	for	Corbyn?	The
myth	of	the	2017	youthquake	election
That	hordes	of	previously	disengaged	young	voters	turned	out	to	support	Jeremy	Corbyn	in	the	2017	election	has
become	something	of	an	assumed	fact.	But	the	assumption	has	been	largely	based	on	anecdotes.	Chris	Prosser,
Ed	Fieldhouse,	Jane	Green,	Jonathan	Mellon,	and	Geoff	Evans	use	the	British	Election	Study	face-to-face	survey
to	examine	the	claim.
In	the	wake	of	the	surprise	outcome	of	the	2017	election	people	began	to	look	for	an	explanation	for	Labour’s
unexpectedly	good	performance.	One	explanation	quickly	became	prominent:	Jeremy	Corbyn	had	mobilised
previously	disengaged	young	voters,	who	had	turned	out	in	droves	to	vote	Labour.	This	claim	is	largely	based	on
anecdotes.	Corbyn	appears	to	be	particularly	popular	amongst	the	young,	often	photographed	surrounded	by	young
people.	Chants	of	‘oh	Jeremy	Corbyn’	echoed	around	the	Glastonbury	festival,	and	Labour’s	social	media	strategy	is
cited	as	energising	young	voters	in	droves.
When	we	turn	to	the	data	we	can	see	that	turnout	went	up	in	constituencies	with	lots	of	young	people.	After	the
election,	one	post-election	poll	suggested	that	turnout	amongst	18-24	year	old	went	up	by	as	much	as	16	percentage
points	in	2017,	with	another	suggesting	an	increase	of	12	points.	The	Labour	‘youthquake’	explanation	looks	to
become	an	assumed	fact	about	the	2017	election.	The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	even	declared	‘youthquake’	their
word	of	the	year.	But	people	have	been	much	too	hasty.	There	was	no	surge	in	youth	turnout	at	the	2017	election.
In	order	to	find	out	what	really	happened	in	the	election,	pollsters	and	academics	have	been	waiting	for	the	turnout
figures	from	the	British	Election	Study	(BES).	Using	the	newly	released	BES	data,	we	analyse	the	relationship
between	age	and	turnout	at	the	2015	and	2017	elections	in	a	new	paper.	Below,	we	graph	the	relationship	between
age	and	turnout	in	2015	and	2017.	In	both	elections,	older	people	are	much	more	likely	to	have	voted	than	young
people	and	the	age-turnout	relationship	barely	changed	between	2015	and	2017.	The	shaded	grey	areas	represent
the	margin	of	error	that	surrounds	the	estimated	level	of	turnout	at	each	age.	There	is	no	evidence	of	a	surge	in	voter
turnout	amongst	the	youngest	eligible	voters	(indeed	turnout	in	the	youngest	age	group	is	actually	slightly	lower	in
our	2017	survey).
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There	was	likely	a	small	increase	in	turnout	across	a	large	age	range,	with	a	slightly	larger	rise	for	those	aged	30-40.
The	margin	of	error	means	that	we	cannot	rule	out	a	small	increase	(or	decrease)	in	youth	turnout	in	2017.	We	can
be	confident,	though,	that	there	was	no	dramatic	surge	in	youth	turnout	of	the	sort	suggested	by	some	other	surveys.
In	short,	there	was	no	‘youthquake’.
So	how	did	people	mistake	anecdote	and	preliminary	survey	evidence	for	the	truth?	Measuring	turnout	in	surveys	is
particularly	tricky.	People	who	don’t	vote	also	tend	to	be	more	reluctant	to	take	surveys.	The	end	result	is	that	we	can
end	up	with	too	many	voters	in	surveys,	making	surveys	insufficiently	representative	of	the	general
population(problems	that	led	to	the	polls	going	awry	in	2015).	Second,	some	people	will	tell	you	they	voted	when
they	actually	didn’t.	This	makes	it	very	difficult	to	work	out	what	the	turnout	rate	amongst	different	groups	actually
was.
Our	best	chance	of	getting	an	accurate	estimate	of	turnout	is	to	use	the	BES	face-to-face	survey	–	the	gold	standard
measure	of	electoral	behaviour	in	Britain	since	1964.	The	BES	face-to-face	survey	is	different	to	other	types	of
survey,	which	tend	to	be	conducted	via	the	internet	and	over	the	phone.	Those	methods	are	particularly	prone	to
problems	of	response	bias	–	the	types	of	people	who	do	surveys	online	or	on	the	phone	are	more	likely	to	vote	than
the	population	as	whole.
The	BES	face-to-face	survey	is	designed	to	be	as	representative	of	the	country	as	possible	–	including	contacting
large	numbers	of	people	who	didn’t	vote	in	the	election.	People	are	selected	at	random	from	thousands	of	addresses
across	the	country	and	doors	are	knocked	until	as	many	people	as	possible	participate.	We	also	verify	people’s
survey	answers	by	checking	the	marked	electoral	register.	Of	course,	the	BES	face-to-face	isn’t	perfect	and	there	is
a	‘margin	of	error’	around	the	turnout	estimates	but	the	results	are	as	close	to	the	truth	about	who	turned	out	to	vote
as	is	possible	to	get.
That	there	was	no	sudden	surge	in	youth	turnout	should	probably	not	be	as	surprising	as	it	is.	Everything	we	know
about	turnout	suggests	that	voting	is	‘sticky’	–	most	people	who	vote	in	one	election	will	go	on	to	vote	at	subsequent
elections,	and	most	people	who	abstain	will	continue	to	do	so.	We	also	know	that	older	people	are	more	likely	to	vote
than	young	people	–	something	that	has	always	been	the	case	in	Britain	and	other	countries.	Turnout	did	go	up	in
2017,	but	only	by	a	small	fraction	(2.5	percentage	points).	All	of	this	suggests	that	large,	sudden,	and	unexpected
shifts	in	the	age-turnout	relationship	are	very	unlikely.
Why	then	did	the	idea	that	there	was	a	surge	in	youth	turnout	take	hold?	In	part	it	is	because	political	commentary	is
prone	to	believing	that	what	politicians	set	out	to	do	is	effective,	even	if	there	is	no	concrete	evidence	that	it	is.
Increasing	youth	turnout	was	part	of	Corbyn’s	political	strategy.	As	Labour	did	unexpectedly	well,	it	is	not
unreasonable	to	think	that	strategy	might	have	paid	off,	even	though	this	turns	out	not	to	be	the	case.
Labour	also	was	more	popular	amongst	young	people	than	old	people	in	2017.	The	figure	below	shows	the
relationship	between	age	and	the	likelihood	of	voting	for	Labour	in	2015	and	2017.	Although	Labour’s	share	of	the
youth	vote	did	increase,	this	is	not	the	same	as	a	surge	in	youth	turnout.	Labour	was	more	popular	amongst	younger
voters	in	2015	as	well	and	Labour’s	popularity	increased	amongst	all	ages	except	for	those	over	70.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Did young voters turn out in droves for Corbyn? The myth of the 2017 youthquake election Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-29
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-myth-of-the-2017-youthquake-election/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
The	relationship	between	age	and	vote	also	changed	significantly	between	2015	and	2017	because	of	older	voters.
The	graph	below	plots	the	probability	of	voting	Conservative	by	age	in	2015	and	2017.	It	shows	a	big	shift	between
2015	and	2017	amongst	the	older	age	group,	as	many	UKIP	voters	switched	to	the	Conservatives	following	the
Brexit	referendum.
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Another	reason	the	idea	of	a	surge	in	youth	turnout	took	hold	is	that	the	constituency	level	data	appeared	to	support
the	claim.	However	drawing	conclusions	about	the	behaviour	of	individuals	from	aggregate	level	data	is	risky	(in
statistics,	this	is	known	as	the	ecological	fallacy).	We	can	see	this	at	work	with	the	change	in	turnout	between	2015
and	2017.	Turnout	did	go	up	in	constituencies	with	more	young	voters:	for	every	percentage	point	increase	in	18	to
29	year	olds	living	in	a	constituency	according	to	the	2011	census,	turnout	went	up	by	0.1	percentage	points
compared	to	2015.
However	it	is	easy	to	show	why	drawing	conclusions	about	the	behaviour	of	young	voters	from	this	sort	of	analysis	is
a	bad	idea.	For	every	percentage	point	increase	in	0	to	4	year	olds	living	in	a	constituency,	turnout	went	up	by	0.9
percentage	points!	Few	people,	it	is	probably	safe	to	say,	think	that	turnout	went	up	in	2017	because	of	a	sudden
surge	in	the	number	of	British	toddlers	voting	in	elections.	2017	was	not	the	toddlerquake	election.	What	this
relationship	is	showing,	of	course,	is	not	that	turnout	went	up	amongst	toddlers	but	that	turnout	went	up	in	sorts	of
places	with	lots	of	toddlers.	The	same	is	true	of	the	relationship	between	the	number	of	young	adults	and	turnout.
Turnout	did	go	up	slightly	in	the	sorts	of	places	with	lots	of	young	adults.	That	does	not	necessarily	mean	it	was
those	young	adults	doing	the	extra	turning	out.
_______
Note:	this	was	originally	published	on	the	British	Election	Study	website,	and	it	is	an	extended	version	of	an	article
published	on	the	BBC	News	website.	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	and	details	of	the	methodology	see	the	authors’
full	paper	here.
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